また、中興通訊は、同社が株式公開企業であることを強調、このことは同社の事業慣行が透明であることを一般国民や情報委員会に保証するものだと説明した。同社のグローバル広報部門のディレクター、David Dai Shu氏は「議会調査に関して、中国企業として前例のないほどの緊密な協力基準を設定している」とし、「当社の機器は安全だ」と述べた。
ト､ 〃l ___ ＞: : ｱ __ {: : /: : l／⌒¨ヽ ｀ ＜ : : : 斗 : : ¨／ {: : {: : :! -‐ `'く: : : : :／ ＼:{: : l / ' ` ＼／ 勹:/ 〃 ! { ﾄ､ ヽ ヽ 〃 }′ .′{ l 圷､ | , }／] :. , / ﾄ |i 乂｣､_｣ L..｀¨.｣ jﾉ斗ｬ' ﾄ､ . / ｌトﾐ |l l{ ｬァf斥ミ 矜｛｜｜ ヽ / |, |ｌ { ﾟ。 乂ン ゞ ﾍ | l ‘. , 見逃してただなんて・・・ . |＼,|l込、__＼ ` 从ﾊ! ‘ |l ir==|l＝⇒ｘ ＿______ ｰt,ｧrv′｣_ l |l | : 八: : : : : : : : : : : ｌ{＿__{ ∨/ｱ l 〃 .ｨ `､ : : ＼: : : :＞ｘ: : : {./: :∧ ∨{ イ . / | | ＼: : : ＼: : : : : ヽ:八:ノ;ム ､!ｲ | / l| |／r≪ニニニニﾆﾏ⌒fゝ---ミﾆ７| | |／{ニニニ≠ニニl{ﾆ介=･冖 Vf｜ | |: : {ニニニニニ才ﾆ才ゝ入 ﾏ=ｧ ,八 : : :寸ニニニニニ７ }ﾆ斗=ヽ У ヽ ∧ : : : :寸ニニニニ7: Yj⇒ｘ _ }｀ｽ /} 〃ﾑ. : : : : :ﾏニニニ７: : j/＼／└fく ∨: ト､ ★★★★★★ White House Military Office breached by Chinese hackers http://www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=13698 There's also speculations that the attack was due to the recent maritime dispute between Japan and China over a group of Japanese islands that the Chinese say belong to them. The fact that the U.S. has a defense treaty in place with Japan and has moved some of its Marine military units near the aforementioned islands might have triggered China's decision to target the WHMO.
[##] GhostShell (TeamGhostShell)さんはTwitterを使っています https://twitter.com/TeamGhostShell publisher of sensitive data worldwide, current projects: #ProjectGhostShell, #ProjectDragonFly, #ProjectWestWind, forever owning China's cyberspace for the lulz Space · http://fbifags.gov
★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★ UbuntuTips/Hardware/SearchHardwareInformation - Ubuntu Japanese Wiki https://wiki.ubuntulinux.jp/UbuntuTips/Hardware/SearchHardwareInformation
fsck (busybox 1.20.2, 2012-08-13 20:17:26 UTC) [fsck: fsck.btrfs(1) -- /mnt/root/] fsck.btrfs -a /dev/disk/by-label/nixos fsck: fsck.btrfs : No such file or directory mounting /dev/disk/by-label/nixos on / ... mount:mounting /dev/disk/by-label/nixos on /mnt-root/ failed: No such device
An error occured in stage 1 of the boot process, which must mount the root filesystem on `/mnt-root` and then start stage 2. press one of the following keys:
i ) to launch an interactive shel; f ) to start an inter active shell having pid 1 (needed if you want to start stage 2`s init manually ); or * ) to ignore the error and continue.
f
/nix/store/nbr39jgbifzas83k1c4j54ls7mvizhqp-extra-utils/bin/ash: can`t access tty; job control turned off
# Copy & Paste & Uncomment & Modify to add any other file system. # # { mountPoint = "/data"; # where you want to mount the device # device = "/dev/sdb"; # the device or the label of the device # # label = "data"; # fsType = "ext3"; # the type of the partition. # options = "data=journal"; # } ];
boot.initrd.kernelModules = [ # Specify all kernel modules that are necessary for mounting the root # file system. # # "ext4" "ata_piix" "vboxdrv" "vboxnetadp" "vboxnetflt" ];
# Copy & Paste & Uncomment & Modify to add any other file system. # # { mountPoint = "/data"; # where you want to mount the device # device = "/dev/sdb"; # the device or the label of the device # # label = "data"; # fsType = "ext3"; # the type of the partition. # options = "data=journal"; # } ];
KDE4を日本語化するためのモジュールをインストールします。 コマンドプロンプトで以下のコマンドを打ってください。 # cd /usr/ports/japanese/kde4-l10n[ENTER] # make config-recursive && make install clean && pkgdb -u[ENTER]
‘binary deployment‘ seems to be a good and fast solution nowadays (i’m talking about open source here). but what prove do i have to check if the source code was modified before compiled and signed (say by downstream::debian)? Note: you can replace debian by any other distribution doing ‘binary deployment’ (it is just an example). how is binary deployment actually done this is very much distribution dependent. in general this workflow is used: download upstream source arrange a build environment apply ‘downstream’ patches install into DESTDIR/PREFIX and create an image from that finally distribute that image (1) can be secured by signatures using cryptographic hashes and a sig file. (2) is complicated as a pure build environment CAN NOT be guaranteed by most distributions while a notable exception is nix as the build chain and all packages are pure (pure means that no mutual effects between two or more installed components do happen). (3) as downstream patches are usually very small they could be checked manually for security related issues. security problems using binary deployment downstream could simply add another ‘evil’ patch in step (3) but when the package got created, the source patch could be removed to hide the modification. this has happended already, see [2]. if the user wants to prevent such a situations there is a limited set of options. he could: chose to only do ‘source deployment’ (like in gentoo) setup his own build environment (debian) which would transform the ‘binary deployment’ into ‘source deployment’ use tools like SELinux and AppArmor (but these tools work best on programs you can’t check as skype for instance or open source tools you assume ‘poor programming practice’ in regards to security) .. another option i’ve been plying with nix lately and as nix is a ‘purely functional package manager’ this implies that step (2) effects are minimized as components don’t interfere. as a result this means: if you clone the original build chain, you could expect the same outcome using the same input. so i experimented with two components: vim apache-httpd the results are very promising as: both projects have a 1:1 file mapping after reinstallation (that means reinstalling would result in the same files being created for each project) only the binaries had differences, that is: both tools contain a timestamp which is of course different DSO (dynamic shared objects) as modules/mod_cgi.so were not timestamped contrary to my expectation edit: it turns out that there was some research on this topic already, see [3] page 30. how did i do the checks i used a prefix installation of nix on gentoo. i set the store path to something like ‘~/mynix/store’ so that every program needs to be recompiled (nix limitation/feature). afterwards i did: nix-env -i apache-httpd ls store| grep apache-httpd cp -R store/gyp2arhqcglbq6iq1hndclljs7v9n30k-apache-httpd-2.2.17/ apache1 nix-env -e apache-http nix-env –delete-generations old nix-store –delete store/gyp2arhqcglbq6iq1hndclljs7v9n30k-apache-httpd-2.2.17/ and then do it again but copy to apache2/ instead. next start the comparing. possible solution to the timestamp problem as it seems that the timestamps are the only problems, here are some thoughts how to overcome this: write a compare utility which ignores timestamps (of course one has to find such regions first) always freeze the clock when compiling and setting it to a fixed time: this could be done by altering the libc library using LD_LIBRARY_PATH to map a indirection layer to the syscalls used for time/date things. remapping syscalls is nothing new (‘trickle is a portable lightweight userspace bandwidth shaper’ uses it). NOTE: this might have unknown side effects and needs to be evaluated as a fixed time will interfere with: a build environment measuring build-time using the time command resetting the clock might result in ‘clock screw detected’ messages and stop building, therefore all files need to be ‘touched’ in order to make that work adding a PACKAGE_MANAGER_BUILD_TIME variable to the build environment. this implies one would either have to alter the buildchain (gcc timestamps) or one would have to patch upstream’s source dependent where that timestamp is applied. but the effect would be that the same timestamp is used resulting in a 1:1 match summary i would really love to experiment further on this topic but i don’t have the time right now to do so. i hope that someone else might take over. i also could imagine a ‘chain of trust’ using gpg signatures. this way we could have a several automated build systems monitoring the sanity of the builds. i also don’t think that the ‘possible solutions’ are of limited use for distributions like debian (i think debian has some kind of build purity but i can’t find the docs right now) and alike. links [1] http://monkey.org/~marius/pages/?page=trickle [2] https://www.redhat.com/archives/fedora-announce-list/2008-August/msg00012.html [3] http://www.st.ewi.tudelft.nl/~dolstra/pubs/nixos-jfp-final.pdf
デバイス間でタブを同期する - Google Chrome ヘルプ https://support.google.com/chrome/bin/answer.py?hl=ja&answer=2591582 Chrome - Google Play の Android アプリ https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.android.chrome
About Our Project | Lunar Linux http://www.lunar-linux.org/about/ The advantage for the end user is clear: a system that is both robust and stable, and easy to install and maintain without sacrificing variety and flexibility. Lunar has built in integrity checking and a robust self-repairing capability. It also enables system users to develop their own source-packages using the toolset.
232 ：login:Penguin [sage] ：2012/10/16(火) 17:41:02.85 ID:vcMNlxra ASUS Announce 2 New Windows 8 Laptops, Both Available With Ubuntu | OMG! Ubuntu! http://www.omgubuntu.co.uk/2012/10/2-new-asus-new-windows-8-laptops-available-with-ubuntu > Only three colours are being made available for the Ubuntu builds ？ white, blue and red, > though it will be cheaper at only ？ - some ？ off of the equivalent Windows version.
>Hackable medical devices are a known problem >there's a great paper on it from Karen Sandler, at that time at the Software Freedom Law Center
Iran Running Out of Physical Currency, Satellite Broadcasts Dropped in Europe http://politics.slashdot.org/sto1ry/12/10/17/1247203/ 経済制裁によるインフレとドイツの紙幣製造会社の受注拒否によって、イランの紙幣供給が滞るという話 インフレしようにも紙幣がないから緩和されるだろうとか、電子化を進めようにもインフラ構築は無理だろうとか、金融システム不信なら仮想通貨(ハードカレンシーを含め)よりもリアル貨幣を手元に置きたくなるとか、BitCoinはうまくいきそうだが電気を喰うから難しいとか。
137+1 ：名無しさん＠お腹いっぱい。 [sage] ：2012/10/13(土) 22:13:44.87 ID:KSU0qzFQ0 [PC] >>136 根本的に何かを勘違いしていないか？ ダウンロード履歴は消えても履歴は消えん >131-132の書き方が微妙な気はするが > A Google Chrome Extension to always clear the downloads list of all completed
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